The Government Contract Defense
in Strict Liability Suits for
Defective Design
The United States government usually does not produce its
own goods; instead, it contracts to have goods produced by the private sector. The government chooses different roles in its contractual relations, ranging from purchasing only an end product and
leaving the production process in the hands of an independent
contractor,1 to controlling the raw materials and production process as well, leaving the contractor to supervise the operation of
the plant.2
This comment focuses on the problems that arise when a strict
products liability suit alleges a defect in a product designed by the
government and manufactured by a private contractor. In the case
of a manufacturing defect, most courts place liability on the contractor.3 In the case of a design defect, the responsibility is logically the government's. Yet sovereign immunity often protects the
government from liability-both from the plaintiff in a direct tort
action for defective design and from the contractor in an indemnity suit. This immunity forces the courts to allocate costs between
the contractor and the injured plaintiff. Seeking to avoid liability,
the contractor asserts a "government contract" defense. This comment argues that this defense should fail in all cases except where
the contractor has been coerced into making the contract. Strict
contractor liability serves a vital function, for contractors are in
the best position to induce the government to absorb its share of
liability costs through adjustments in its contractual relationships.

See Ingrado, Types of Government Contracts, 18 A.F.L. REV. 63, 64-68 (1976).
2 See, e.g., Powell v. United States Cartridge Co., 339 U.S. 497 (1950) (government-

owned munitions plant operated by private contractors).
3 One commentator has said that "the manufacturing flaw area represents a happy coincidence of the substantively desirable and the institutionally feasible." Henderson, Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1546 (1973).
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DEFINITION OF TERMS

Design Defects

There are two basic types of products liability actions: those
for manufacturing defects and those for defects in design . 4 Products with manufacturing defects do not conform to the intended
design or to the majority of products made according to the design;
the design thus serves as a standard by which a court can measure
the deviation caused by the manufacturing flaw. Where there is a
design defect, on the other hand, the product conforms to the intended design, but the design itself is dangerous. There are two
kinds of design defects. An inadvertent design error, which courts
may treat as a manufacturing flaw, is unwitting and inhibits the
intended use of the product. A conscious design choice, in contrast,
is chosen by the manufacturer for its utility despite its inherent
risk of harm. Because there is no internal standard by which to
judge defectiveness in cases of conscious design choice, courts must
devise their own tests of reasonableness, weighing the utility of the
product against the risk of harm. For purposes of the government
contract defense, the analysis should proceed similarly in both the
inadvertent design defect and the conscious design choice cases.5
In some cases of conscious design choice, courts impose a duty
to warn if the warning can make an otherwise unreasonably dangerous product acceptable.6 The government contractor should be
4 Id. at 1542-44. The distinctions drawn in text are essentially those drawn by
Henderson.
5 This comment does not discuss the difficulties inherent in the concept of a design
defect or the competence of courts to resolve them. See generally R. EPSTEIN, MODERN
PRODucTs LIABILTY LAW 68-93 (1980); Henderson, supra note 3, at 1565-77; Henderson,
Renewed Judicial Controversy Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservationof
an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L. REv. 773 (1979). A more favorable view of the design
defect concept and the courts' performance is found in Twerski, Weinstein, Donaher &
Piehler, The Use and Abuse of Warnings in Products Liability-Design Defect Litigation
Comes of Age, 61 CORNELL L. REv. 495 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Twerski].
Nor does the comment discuss judicial reluctance to find government design defects,
see, e.g., Hunt v. Blasius, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978); Sanner v. Ford Motor Co.,
144 N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381
A.2d 805 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977), for the analysis should not vary with the identity of
the designer.
6 See, e.g., McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 333, 154 N.W.2d 488, 496-97
(1967) (manufacturer liable for failure to warn of dangers of hot water vaporizer jar). Where
even a proper warning cannot render the design of the product safe enough to market,
courts rely directly on design defect analysis. Id. at 333-34, 154 N.W.2d at 497. See also
Twerski, supra note 5, at 500-05.
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liable for the government designer's failure to warn:7 a product
that is unreasonably dangerous because there is no warning should
be treated like a product that is unreasonably dangerous because
of an inadvertent design defect. If following government specifications would be insufficient to relieve the contractor of liability in
the latter instance, the government contract defense should be de8
nied in the former as well.
B.

The Government Contract Defense

The essence of the government contract defense is that the
contractor, by relying on government design specifications, should
be absolved of liability for defective design. Unless design defects
are "glaring and obvious," contractors escape liability in negligence
actions by showing they complied with government specifications. 9
Courts do not agree, however, on the availability of the government contract defense in strict products liability. Some jurisdictions extend such liability to parties like the contractor who, although they did not create the defect, were in the chain of
distribution and exerted control over the defective product.10
Other jurisdictions reject this extension of liability and allow the
government contract defense even in strict products liability
suits.'

7 Moreover, where the contractor is the cheapest cost avoider, he should be liable for
his own failure to warn. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in
Torts, 81 YALE L.J. 1055, 1062 (1972).
8 When a government employee is injured, the government fills two roles: employer and
designer. For the view that the duty to warn should not attach to the manufacturer of a
product when there is a "responsible intermediary" such as the government employer between the manufacturer and the ultimate user, see R. EPSTEIN, supra note 5, at 93-110.
9 Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 802 n.16 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (maritime law), affd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). See also Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan
Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924); text and notes at notes 31-34 infra.
"0For instance, in Challoner v. Day & Zimmermanmi, Inc., 512 F.2d 77 (5th Cir.) (Texas
law), vacated on choice of law grounds, 423 U.S. 3 (1975), the plaintiff sued a government
contractor who had manufactured a defective howitzer round. The round was produced according to government design specifications. The Fifth Circuit, applying Texas strict liability law, upheld liability for the design defect despite the defendant's argument that the
design was exclusively in the control of the government. The court distinguished negligence
and strict liability- "A strict liability case, unlike a negligence case, does not require that the
defendant's act or omission be the cause of the defect. It is only necessary that the product
be defective when it leaves the defendant's control." Id. at 83. See also Foster v. Day &
Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) (Iowa law). Most jurisdictions apply this
form of analysis to hold retailers liable for defects created by the manufacturer. See note 37
infra.
11 For instance, in Hunt v. Blasius, 55 Ill. App. 3d 14, 370 N.E.2d 617 (1977), aff'd, 74
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THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

There are three actors in the government design defect situation-the injured plaintiff, the contractor, and the government.
Each seeks to avoid the burden of defective design specifications.
Because sovereign immunity usually protects the government, the
availability of the government contract defense is crucial to deciding whether the plaintiff or the contractor bears the burden of the
defect. This part explores how the legal framework distributes that
burden, with an eye to evaluating the government contract defense
in the strict liability context. To do so, it analyzes the rules governing suits by plaintiffs against the government, by plaintiffs
against contractors, and by contractors against the government; it
then examines the additional defenses that contractors may assert
against plaintiffs.
A.

Plaintiff v. United States

1. Negligence. In 1946 Congress enacted a limited waiver of
sovereign immunity in the Federal Tort Claims Act ("FTCA"). 2
The Act permits suit against the government but exempts a number of government actions from its ambit. For example, the government is not liable for many discretionary acts of its employees.1 3
The Supreme Court applied the discretionary function exception to government specifications in Dalehite v. United States,14 a

Ill. 2d 203, 384 N.E.2d 368 (1978), the plaintiffs were injured when their vehicle collided
with a steel sign pole embedded in concrete. They claimed that the designs of both the pole
and the highway were defective. The trial and intermediate courts agreed that the complaint stated a cause of action for design defect, but ruled that adherence to state specifications relieved the pole manufacturer of liability. Id. at 20, 370 N.E.2d at 621-22. For an
approving appraisal of the appellate court opinion, see Note, Hunt v. Blasius: A Gap in the
Application of the Illinois Strict Products Liability Theory, 11 Loy. CHI. L.J. 147 (1979).
The Illinois Supreme Court found no defect. 74 Ill. 2d 203, 212, 384 N.E.2d 368, 372 (1978).
For another successful government contract defense case, see Sanner v. Ford Motor Co., 144
N.J. Super. 1, 364 A.2d 43 (Super. Ct. Law Div. 1976), aff'd, 154 N.J. Super. 407, 381 A.2d
805 (Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977).
" Act of Aug. 6, 1946, ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified primarily at 28 U.S.C. §§ 26712680 (1976)).
" The discretionary function exception provides that no liability shall attach to:
Any claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the Government, exercising
due care, in the execution of a statute or regulation, whether or not such statute or
regulation be valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise
or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or not the discretion involved be abused.
Id. § 2680(a).
-4 346 U.S. 15 (1953).
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negligence action for deaths caused by an explosion of ammonium
nitrate fertilizer produced and shipped under government control.
The Court held that the discretionary function exception "includes
determinations made by executives or administrators in establishing plans, specifications or schedules of operations. ' 15 Because the
decisions were made at the planning, rather than the operational
level, the Court denied recovery under the FTCA.1'
In elaborating the Dalehite definition of the discretionary
function exception, lower courts have developed a test, inconsistently applied, based on whether the design reflects a government
"policy" decision. 17 Under this test, the government escapes liability if its designs embody policy choices; if they do not, the govern-ment may be sued.' Until the Supreme Court develops a more rigorous definition of this exception, the availability of a negligence
suit against the government for its design defects is problematic. 19
2. Strict Liability. The Supreme Court's decision in Laird v.
Nelms2" precludes a suit against the government based on strict
liability. Nelms sued for damage caused by the sonic boom of a
military plane, basing his case on a theory of strict liability for ultrahazardous activities. The Court concluded that the FTCA per16Id.

at 35-36 (footnote omitted).

Id.
See Zillman, The Changing Meanings of Discretion:Evolution in the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 76 Mm.L. REv. 1 (1977); Comment, Federal Tort Claims: A Critique of the
Planning Level-OperationalLevel Test, 11 U.S.F.L. REv. 170, 179 n.60 (1976), and cases
cited therein.
18 See, e.g., Moyer v. Martin Marietta Corp., 481 F.2d 585 (5th Cir. 1973) (selection of
B-57 aircraft by Secretary of the Air Force was discretionary function; acceptance of aircraft
system, such as an ejection seat and its mechanism, was not); Stanley v. United States, 347
F. Supp. 1088 (D. Me. 1972) (federal design of radio tower excluding guard rail not discretionary function unless related to policy considerations underlying decision to engage in particular activity), vacated on other grounds, 476 F.2d 606 (1st Cir. 1973). Cf. Daniel v. United
States, 426 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1970) (United States cannot be sued for negligent design of
concrete traffic separator because approval of plans and specifications for interstate highway
in accordance with criteria of traffic needs, safety, durability, and economy of maintenance
is a discretionary function).
19 Even where a plaintiff can sue the United States in negligence, the alternative of
suing the contractor still should be available. The equities may shift somewhat in favor of
the contractor, because the plaintiff with a FTCA action against the government can achieve
directly what the contractor's suit accomplishes indirectly: it forces the government to absorb the true costs of its procurement programs. See part III infra. But the FTCA is not, by
its terms, restricted to plaintiffs with no other cause of action. See Zillman, supra note 17,
at 36-37. Nor is the common law cause of action against the contractor superseded by the
creation of a statutory cause of action against the United States. Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co., 317 U.S. 575, 579 (1943).
18
7

2o 406 U.S. 797 (1972).
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mits recovery only for a "negligent or wrongful act or omission"2 1
and that absolute liability therefore was precluded. Although the
decision has been the subject of much criticism,22 the Court has
not repudiated it.
3. Additional Statutory Relief. Other statutes provide limited
relief against the United States in special circumstances. If the
plaintiff is a government employee or in the military service, he
falls within the federal workers' compensation statutes and may
recover for injuries resulting from defective design specifications if
the injuries arise out of or in the course of his employment. As
with all workers' compensation schemes, the statutes provide an
assured minimum level of compensation in exchange for relief from
the vagaries of litigation. 23 The Federal Employees Compensation
Act ("FECA"),2 4 which covers the government's civilian employees,
has an express exclusivity clause 2 5 that precludes recovery under
the FTCA. Although the statute governing compensation of miliits very existary personnel2 s contains no such exclusivity clause,
27
FTCA.
the
under
suits
bar
to
held
been
has
tence
Plaintiffs who have no employment relationship with the
government may benefit from special legislation-for example, the
Military Claims Act 28 or the Swine Flu Act 29-that creates a nar21 Id. at 799.
2,See Peck, Laird v. Nelms: A Call for Review and Revision of the Federal Tort
Claims Act, 48 WASH. L. REv. 391 (1973); Reynolds, Strict Liability Under the FederalTort
Claims Act: Does "Wrongful" Cover a Few Sins, No Sins, or Non-Sins?, 23 AM. U.L. REv.
813 (1974); 6 AKRON L. REv. 105 (1973); Case Comment, 25 U. FLA. L. REV. 408 (1973).
23 See Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties, 1977 Wis. L. REv. 1035, 1039.
24 5 U.S.C. §§ 8101-8193 (1976).
5 Id. § 8116(c).
2'Veterans' Benefits Act, 38 U.S.C. §§ 101-5228 (1976).
2'See Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135, 144-45 (1950), which involved injuries to
servicemen "incident" to their military service. In one of the three cases consolidated for
Supreme Court review, the soldier had a clear negligence claim: an Army surgeon had left a
30-inch towel in the soldier's stomach after abdominal surgery. Id. at 137.
The Supreme Court offered three reasons for barring recovery under the FTCA. First,
under the FTCA the government is relegated to the status of a private individual, but in the
military context there is "no liability of a 'private individual' even remotely analogous to
that... [asserted] against the United States." Id. at 141. No individual can conscript or
mobilize an army as the government can; no individual superior can be liable to a soldier for
injuries suffered in the service. Id. at 141-42. Second, the FTCA incorporates state law for
its rules of decision, but relations between a soldier and the government should be subject to
uniform, federal law. Id. at 142-44. Finally, the existence of compensation schemes for
injured servicemen makes reliance on the FTCA unnecessary. Id. at 144-45.
28 10 U.S.C. §§ 2731-2737 (1976). This act provides that the United States may settle
claims up to $25,000 for damage to or loss of real or personal property, personal injury, or
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rowly defined waiver of sovereign immunity. Otherwise, plaintiffs
can sue the government for its defective designs only if they can
bring themselves within the FTCA. Under that act, a negligence
action sometimes may be brought, but a strict liability action is
always barred.3 0
B.

Plaintiff v. Government Contractor

1. Negligence. A negligence action against an independent
contractor focuses on the standard of care he must use in following
someone else's design specifications. The contractor will be relieved of liability "if he follows plans which are not so glaringly or
patently insufficient that an ordinary prudent manufacturer would
not follow them. '3' The "glaring and obvious" rule, which applies
both to private and to public contracts, 2 does not deviate from the
usual "ordinary care" standard as much as one might think. The
independent contractor typically is not considered a specialist, for
his primary responsibility is to follow orders; 33 where the contractor hires a specialist who is just as capable of assessing the design
as is the designer himself, the contractor is held to the ordinary

death, if the injury is "caused by a civilian officer or employee of [a military] department, or
the Coast Guard, or a member of the [military] or Coast Guard. . .acting within the scope
of his employment, or otherwise incident to noncombat activities of [the military] or the
Coast Guard." Id. § 2733(a).
2' National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, 42 U.S.C. §§ 247b(j)-247b()
(1976). This act gives plaintiffs a direct cause of action against the United States under the
FTCA in exchange for a forfeiture of the right to sue the vaccine manufacturers, id.
§ 247b(k). The plaintiff can rely on any state law liability theory that would have been
available against the manufacturer, id. § 247b(k)(2)(A)(i); he must, however, follow the procedural and administrative requirements of the FTCA, id. § 247b(k)(1)(B)(ii).
30 See text and notes at notes 12-22 supra.
3' Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 802 n.16 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) (maritime law), afl'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967).
32 For public contracts, see, e.g., Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F.
Supp. 791 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (maritime law), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967); Person v.
Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.) (New York law), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 936
(1951); Russell v. Arthur Whitcomb, Inc., 100 N.H. 171, 121 A.2d 781 (1956); Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 145 N.E. 321 (1924). For private contracts, see, e.g.,
Spangler v. Kranco, Inc., 481 F.2d 373 (4th Cir. 1973) (Virginia law); Davis v. Henderlong
Lumber Co., 221 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Ind. 1963) (Indiana law); Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 205
Neb. 292, 287 N.W.2d 430 (1980).
33 See Ryan v. Feeney & Sheehan Bldg. Co., 239 N.Y. 43, 45, 145 N.E. 321, 321 (1924)
("How was an ordinary contractor or builder to know [the strength of iron supports and
braces and the proper angles at which they should be placed]? The matter was for the
engineers and architects to determine and design." The contractor "was justified in relying
upon the experience and skill of the architect and supervising engineer.").
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care standard of the expert.3 4
2. Strict Liability. Depending on the applicable state law, the
plaintiff also may state a cause of action against the contractor in
strict liability. A contractor can be held liable for defective design
specifications supplied by the government in jurisdictions that recognize a cause of action based on defective design" and vicarious
liability of those in the chain of distribution."
Most states recognize at least one form of vicarious liability-retailer liability for a defectively designed or manufactured
product, even though the defect is latent and therefore not discoverable by investigation. 7 A plaintiff's cause of action against a
contractor for the defective design specifications of another is analogous to a cause of action against a retailer for either the construction or design defects of the product manufacturer. Consequently,
those states with retailer liability are likely to recognize a cause of
action against a contractor for defective design when the specifications are supplied by someone else.
Section 402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts5 sets out
31 Person v. Cauldwell-Wingate Co., 187 F.2d 832 (2d Cir.) (New York law), cert.
denied, 341 U.S. 936 (1951).
3' The extension of strict liability principles to cases of design defect has been criticized, see Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negligence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593, 599-600 (1980); Hoenig,
Product Designs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U.L. REv.
109, 123-36 (1976). See generally R. EPSTEIN, supra note 5; Henderson, supra note 5.
Contra, Twerski, supra note 5.
36 Vicarious liability holds a retailer liable for design defects caused by those further
back in the chain of distribution. Its theory is that the plaintiff should be able to sue the
party he has dealt with and knows most about, leaving the battles over apportionment of
liability to the parties elsewhere in the distributional chain. See, e.g., Vandermark v. Ford
Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); text and note at note 46
infra. Parallel reasoning would allow the plaintiff here to sue the government contractor,
leaving it to the contractor to seek indemnity from the government designer. See text and
notes at notes 46-79 infra.
' RE STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f (1965) [hereinafter cited as

RESTATEMENT]: "The rule stated in this Section applies to any person engaged in the busi-

ness of selling products for use or consumption. It therefore applies to any manufacturer of
such a product, to any wholesale or retail dealer or distributor, and to the operator of a
restaurant." See, e.g., O.S. Stapley Co. v. Miller, 103 Ariz. 556, 447 P.2d 248 (1968); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896 (1964); Hiigel v.
General Motors Corp., 190 Colo. 57, 544 P.2d 983 (1975); Crowe v. Public Bldg. Comm'n, 74
Ill. 2d 10, 383 N.E.2d 951 (1978); Kleve v. General Motors Corp., 210 N.W.2d 568 (Iowa
1973); Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Mead v. Warner Pruyn
Div., 57 A.D.2d 340, 394 N.Y.S.2d 483 (1977); Moss v. Polyco, Inc., 522 P.2d 622 (Okla.
1974); Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967). Contra, Sam Shainberg Co.
v. Barlow, 258 So. 2d 242 (Miss. 1972).
38 That section provides:
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the prerequisites for a products liability suit. Strict liability for
personal injury or property damage attaches to the seller of a defective product when it reaches the consumer in the same condition as when sold, even though the seller exercised due care and
the consumer had no contractual relationship with him. The requirements would appear to apply to a government contractor who
manufactures a product in accordance with the government's design specifications. If the design is defective, the product as manufactured will be defective when it leaves the contractor's control.
Assuming that causation is shown and that there is no evidence of
misuse or assumption of risk, the contractor fits into the strict liability mold much as the typical product manufacturer does.
One potential hurdle to recovery is the Restatement's requirement that the products liability defendant be a "seller [of the defective and unreasonably dangerous product] . . . engaged in the
business of selling such a product. "' 9 Courts that find the contractor liable in the government or private design defect case use a
broad definition of "sell," rejecting the contractor's claim that he is
an assembler rather than a seller.40 Instead they emphasize that
the contractor is paid for each product manufactured, is within the
chain of distribution, and intentionally places the product in the
stream of commerce.4 1
§ 402A. Special Liability of Seller of Product for Physical Harm to User or Consumer.
(1) One who sells any product in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous to the
user or consumer or to his property is subject to liability for physical harm thereby
caused to the ultimate user or consumer, or to his property, if
(a) the seller is engaged in the business of selling such a product, and
(b) it is expected to and does reach the user or consumer without substantial
change in the condition in which it is sold.
(2) The rule stated in subsection (1) applies although
(a) the seller has exercised all possible care in the preparation and sale of his
product, and
(b) the user or consumer has not bought the product from or entered into any
contractual relation with the seller.
Some jurisdictions have adopted strict liability without reference to the RESTATEMENT.
3 Id. § 402A(1)(a).
40 See, e.g., Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) (Iowa law);
Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4 (2d Cir. 1964) (New York law); Bachner v. Pearson,
479 P.2d 319 (Alaska 1970).
41 See, e.g., Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867, 872 (8th Cir. 1974) (Iowa
law) ("Whether the manufacturer 'sells' his product in the normal sense of that word, leases
it, or supplies it for a sole purchaser under contractual arrangements such as those present
here, the policy considerations involving the doctrine of strict liability remain the same."). A
cost-plus contract by which a product is put into commerce is also an "essentially commercial" transaction, and strict liability therefore attaches. Challoner v. Day & Zimmermann,
Inc., 512 F.2d 77, 82 (5th Cir.) (Texas law), vacated on choice of law grounds, 423 U.S. 3
(1975).
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These courts also reject the argument that even if the defendant is a seller, he sells the service of assembling rather than a
product. According to the prevailing view, strict liability is not applicable to suppliers of services. 42 A repairer or installer may be a
seller within the meaning of the Restatement for "injuries caused
by defects in products supplied by [him] in the course of [his] services . . . [but not] for failing to correct or warn of pre-existing
defects in products on which [he] has contracted to work."' 3 The
contractor argues that, like the repairer and installer, he performs
his services by working with materials and designs provided by
others. This analogy is not adequately descriptive of the contractor's role, however. He not only supplies a service, but sells the
product as well, and he makes a profit on each product manufactured rather than being paid in sum for his services, as are re44
pairers and installers. Such a "hybrid service-sale transaction"
distinguishes the government contractor from the installer or repairer. Under a broad interpretation of the "sales" requirement of
section 402A, the hybrid service-sale transaction qualifies for strict
45
products liability.

Some argue that a contractor who manufactures a product for the exclusive use of the
designer is not exposing the public at large to the risks of a defective product. However, the
contractor cannot always anticipate where the product will end up or whether bystanders
will be injured. See Littlehale v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 268 F. Supp. 791, 795
(S.D.N.Y. 1966) (13 years after being manufactured for the military, explosives ended up in
civilian hands), aff'd, 380 F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1967). In addition, there is no reason to set lower
safety standards because a limited group rather than the public at large is exposed to the
product. See Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 520 F.2d 867, 871 (8th Cir. 1974) (Iowa
law) ("We believe the public interest in human life and health requires the protection of the
law against the manufacture of defective explosives, whether they are to be used by members of the public at large or members of the public serving in our armed forces.").
42 Nickel v. Hyster Co., 97 Misc. 2d 770, 771, 412 N.Y.S.2d 273, 274-75 (Sup. Ct. 1978).
See also Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 Ill. App. 2d 153, 162, 222 N.E.2d 584, 589 (1966)
(engineer who designed pylons not subject to strict liability); Delta Refining Co. v. Procon,
Inc., 552 S.W.2d 387, 389 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976) (installer not liable in strict liability).
43 Johnson v. William C. Ellis & Sons Iron Works, Inc., 604 F.2d 950, 955 (5th Cir.
1979) (Mississippi law). The court noted that, because Mississippi relieves retailers of liability for latent defects, its state courts probably would not impose liability on repairers.
" Nickel v. Hyster Co., 97 Misc. 2d 770, 773, 412 N.Y.S.2d 273, 276 (Sup. Ct 1978). See
also Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 593, 258 A.2d 697, 701 (1969); Note, Products
and the Professional:Strict Liability in the Sale-Service Hybrid Transaction,24 HASTINGS
L.J. 111, 116 (1972).
" See Note, supra note 44, at 131; Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel
Under Assault, 10 ST. MARY'S L.J. 13, 32 (1978) (Challoner distinguished "from the typical
'service' case since in reality the 'service' provided by the defendant was manufacturing. The
entire transaction with the government was commercial in nature.").
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A plaintiff therefore has more promising remedies against the
contractor than against the government. He can sue the contractor
on a negligence theory if he can show either that the design defect
is glaring and obvious or that the contractor has access to expertise
that warrants holding him to a more stringent duty of care. He also
can sue the contractor in strict products liability in states that
first, recognize such a suit for design defects; second, permit vicarious liability; and third, are willing to define the concept of seller
under the Restatement to include a contractor.
C.

Government Contractor v. United States

1. Tort Indemnity. In strict products liability, a defendant
who is held responsible for a product defect, such as a retailer, can
shift the burden to the party actually responsible for the defect,
such as the manufacturer, through a third party indemnity claim.4 6
In United States v. Yellow Cab Co.,47 the Supreme Court held that
the United States can be impleaded 48 on a theory of indemnity or
contribution if the government is wholly or partially responsible
for an injury.49 The Court qualified the Yellow Cab doctrine in
Stencel Aero EngineeringCorp. v. United States50 by holding that
a contractor may implead the government only where the original
plaintiff could have sued the government directly. 51 The contractor's suit in that case was barred because the tort victim had surrendered his right to sue under the FTCA for coverage under the
46 See generally Greenstone, Spreading the Loss-Indemnity, Contribution,Comparative Negligence and Subrogation, 13 FORUM 266 (1977); Jensvold, A Modern Approach to
Loss Allocation Among Tortfeasors in Products Liability Cases, 1974 INs. L.J. 591;
O'Donnell, Implied Indemnity in Modern Tort Litigation: The Case for a Public Policy
Analysis, 6 SETON HALL L. REV. 268 (1975); Phillips, Contributionand Indemnity in Products Liability, 42 TENN. L. REV. 85 (1974); Comment, Contributionand Indemnity: Does
the Right Exist Among Joint Tortfeasors When One is Liable on a Theory of Strict Liability?, 18 S. TEX. L.J. 572 (1977); Comment, Comparative Causation, Indemnity, and the
Allocation of Losses Between Joint Tortfeasors in ProductsLiability Cases, 10 ST. MARY's
L.J. 587 (1979).
"' 340 U.S. 543 (1951).
4' The impleader action is governed by state law. Id. at 546.
49 Id. at 552, 556-57. Although Yellow Cab decided only the issue of contribution, the
Court in Stencel Aero Eng'r Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666, 669 (1977), interpreted the
opinion as deciding the issue of impleader "under a theory of indemnity or contribution."
50 431 U.S. 666 (1977). The Court saw itself as resolving the tension between Feres v.
United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950), which barred recovery, and Yellow Cab, which allowed
it. 431 U.S. at 670. For opposing evaluations of the Stencel opinion, see Hertz, The Tort
Triangle: Contributionfrom Defendants Whom Plaintiffs Cannot Sue, 32 MAINE L. REV. 83
(1980) (supporting Stencel); Note, 29 HASTINGS L.J. 1217 (1978) (criticizing Stencel).
51 431 U.S. at 673-74.
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military compensation system. 2 The trend of the courts of appeals
after Stencel is to deny noncontractual indemnity in situations involving the government's civilian employees as well.5 These courts
rule against tort indemnity "either because of the language of the
exclusive remedy provision [of the FECA] or because of the extinguishment of the government's underlying tort liability to its
54
employees."
United Air Lines, Inc. v. Wiener,55 which involved a collision
between a commercial airliner and an Air Force jet, illustrates how
these limitations work in practice. The injured United passengers
recovered from the airline, which in turn sought indemnity from
the government. The airline recovered fully for its payments to
nongovernmental employees, but was not reimbursed for sums
paid to the government's civilian and military employees. 56
2. Implied Contractual Indemnity. Where tort indemnity is
barred, some courts have allowed contractors to shift liability to
the government by a claim for implied contractual indemnity if the
circumstances of the contractual relationship warrant the inference
of a promise by the government to indemnify the contractor.5 7 One
court has suggested that contractual indemnification may be implied from the existence of the following factors: first, the product
was designed exclusively by the government; second, the design
was approved by an agency head; third, the contract required assembly in accordance with government specifications; and finally,
the contractor could make no changes without express instructions
from the government.5 8 In addition, if the government designer re2 The Stencel decision was based on the reasoning in Feres v. United States, 340 U.S.
135 (1950). See note 27 supra.
" Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1975); Travelers Ins. Co. v. United
States, 493 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1974); Newport Air Park, Inc. v. United States, 419 F.2d 342
(1st Cir. 1969); Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361 (D.C. Cir. 1968); United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v.
United States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). Contra, Wallenius Bremen G. m. b. H. v. United States,
409 F.2d 994 (4th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 958 (1970) (indemnity permitted).
U Galimi v. Jetco, Inc., 514 F.2d 949, 953 (2d Cir. 1975). See text and notes at notes 2427 supra.
5- 335 F.2d 379 (9th Cir.), cert. dismissed sub nom. United Air Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 379 U.S. 951 (1964). Both United Air Lines and the government were sued under the
state wrongful death statutes. Id. at 384.
56 Id. at 402-04.
51 See, e.g., Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Supp. 1010 (D.R.I. 1977) (Rhode Island
law), aff'd, 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 916 (1979); Travelers Ins.
Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 881 (3d Cir. 1974). See also Comment, Contribution and
Indemnity in California, 57 CALIm. L. REv. 490, 493 (1969).
58 Travelers Ins. Co. v. United States, 493 F.2d 881, 888 (3d Cir. 1974).
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jected safety measures proposed by the contractor or undertook to
assemble -safety devices itself, the contractor might be able to state
a claim for implied contractual indemnity on the theory that the
government operated as a "co-manufacturer." 5'
3. Express Contractual Indemnity. The most effective recourse a contractor has against the government is his contract; he
can negotiate for certain express contractual clauses that will clarify the distribution of risk from the outset. There are numerous
forms of agreement that can be used by a government contractor,
ranging from a fixed-price contract, where the contractor accepts
full liability, to a cost-reimbursement contract, where the government bears some or all of the risk. 0
There is limited statutory authority that allows fixed-price
defense contractors to be indemnified under certain circumstances.6 1 In fixed-price contracts for research and development,
indemnification for liability from unusually hazardous risks may be
provided if the loss or injury to persons or property arises from the
direct performance of the contract and if the harm is not compensated by insurance or otherwise.6 2 A second grant of indemnifica59Cf. Roy v. Star Chopper Co., 442 F. Supp. 1010, 1020 (D.R.I. 1977) (Rhode Island
law) (nongovernmental designer), afl'd, 584 F.2d 1124 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S.
916 (1979). The court did not allow the express representation of the purchaser-designer to
constitute a defense in the original suit by the plaintiff against the contractor. Once the
plaintiff recovered, however, the express representations could be used to support a contractual indemnity claim brought by the contractor against the purchaser-designer. Id. at
1021.
Barr v. Brezina Constr. Co., 464 F.2d 1141 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125
(1973), involving a government designer, denied the contractual indemnity claim. The
court's reasoning was perverse, however: indemnity was denied precisely because the contractor had shown his knowledge of the defect by calling it to the attention of the government and unsucessfully seeking permission to depart from the specifications to remedy it.
60 Incentive contracts, a third form of express agreement, can be classified either as
fixed-price incentive or as cost-plus-incentive-fee contracts. For purposes of third party liability, they are like fixed-price and cost-reimbursement contracts, respectively. Ginsburg,
Allocation of Risk: ContractorResponsibility for Injury to Government Property and to
Third Parties Under Supply and R & D Contracts,2 PuB. CONT. L.J. 333, 352 (1969). The
only form of contract that cannot be used in military procurement is the cost-plus-a-percentage-of-cost type. 10 U.S.C. § 2306(a) (1976); Armed Services Procurement Regulation,
32 C.F.R. § 3-401(a)(2) (1980) [hereinafter cited as ASPR].
6- 10 U.S.C. § 2354(a) (1976); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1435 (1976) (commonly known as Public Law 85-804 and hereinafter so cited). This authorization is reflected in a group of contractual provisions, set forth in government regulations, that are to be used "when applicable." See, e.g., ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-303 (1980) (fixed-price contract); id. § 7-303.61
(indemnification under 10 U.S.C. § 2354) (fixed-price contract); id. § 7-303.62 (indemnification under Public Law 85-804) (fixed-price contract).
62 10 U.S.C. § 2354(a) (1976); ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-303.61 (1980) (fixed-price R
& D
contract). See also ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 10-701 (1980) (indemnification under research and

1981]

Government ContractDefense

1043

tion is found in the Executive Order's implementing Public Law
85-804. 6 This grant is not limited by its terms to research and development contracts, but permits the Defense Department to enter
into an indemnity agreement when the contract involves an unusually hazardous or nuclear risk and when the Secretary or his representative decides the national defense will be facilitated thereby.
The Executive Order permits indemnification beyond the contract
ceiling price for third party liability; 5 it also allows the indemnification provision to be applied to the subcontractor. 6
The cost-reimbursement contract affords the contractor
greater protection: third party liability costs generally are included
within the rubric of costs the government will reimburse.6 7 One
drawback, however, is that a cost-reimbursement contract often
contains a "limitation of cost" or "limitation of funds" clause,
which obligates the government to reimburse the contractor only
up to the level of appropriations for the particular contract.6 , As
payments are made to the contractor, there is less money left in
reserve to pay liability costs.6 Both the General Services Administration7 0 and the Department of Defense7 1 have promulgated regulations eliminating the ceiling for third party liability claims. Both
sets of regulations provide that in cost-reimbursement supply contracts and in research and development contracts, the government
development contracts against unusually hazardous risks).
63

Exec. Order No. 10,789, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897 (1958), reprinted at 50 U.S.C. § 1431

(1976) (as amended). See also ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-303.62 (1980) (fixed-price); id. § 10-702
(indemnification under Public Law 85-804).
04 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1435 (1976); see note 61 supra.
" Exec. Order No. 10,789, § 1A, 23 Fed. Reg. 8897 (1958), reprintedat 50 U.S.C. § 1431
(1976) (as amended).
06 Id. § 1A(b)(1)(D). See also Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 359.
17 See, e.g., Federal Procurement Regulation, 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.204-5(c) (1980) [hereinafter cited as FPR] (supply contract); id. § 1-7.404-9(a) (R & D contract); ASPR, 32 C.F.R.
§ 7-203.22 (1980) (supply contract); id. § 7-402.26 (R & D contract). The General Services
Administration promulgates the Federal Procurement Regulations, which are binding on all
government agencies. Implementation and supplementation are left to individual agencies.
The statutory authority for indemnification provisions in cost-reimbursement contracts is
found at 10 U.S.C. § 2354(a) (1976); 50 U.S.C. §§ 1431-1435 (1976) (Public Law 85-804). See
also ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 403.56 (1980) (indemnification under 10 U.S.C. § 2354) (cost-reimbursement contract); id. § 403.57 (indemnification under Public Law 85-804) (cost-reimbursement contract).
66 See, e.g., FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.202-3 (1980) (supply contract); id. § 1-7.402-2 (R & D
contract); ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-203.3 (1980) (supply contract); id. § 7-402.2 (R & D
contract).
6" Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 337.
7" FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.204-5 (1980) (supply contract); id. § 1-7.404-9 (R & D contract).
71 ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-203.22 (1980) (supply contract); id. § 7-402.26 (R & D contract).
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will pay the reasonable costs of that portion of the contractor's insurance that is "allocable to this contract"; that the government
will reimburse the contractor for liabilities to third parties for
property damage or personal injury, regardless of the "limitation of
funds" clause; and that the government will reimburse the contractor for liability "whether or not caused by [his] negligence," except
in cases of "willful misconduct or lack of good faith. '72 The contractor covered by these regulations therefore can secure full reimbursement for insurance costs and liabilities in excess of insurance
73
coverage.
4. Special Indemnity Provisions. Legislation providing for
contractor indemnification sometimes is enacted to foster particular activities. For instance, the Price-Anderson Act 74 provides that
the United States will indemnify a nuclear facility for nuclear accidents that exceed the required level of insurance protection, if the
facility complies with licensing and financial prerequisites.7 5 The
statute has two stated purposes: to "protect the public" and to
"encourage the development of the atomic energy industry. '76
If the government must deal with all suppliers as a group, they
may have enough leverage to demand a legislative solution to the
72 FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.204-5 (1980) (supply contract); id. § 1-7.404-9 (R & D contract);
ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-203.22 (1980) (supply contract); id. § 7-402.26 (R & D contract). Implementation is described in the "allowable cost, fee, and payment" clause, which provides an
exception to the general requirement that the contractor release the government from liability under the contract, once performance is completed, for
[c]laims, together with reasonable expenses incidental thereto, based upon liabilities of
the Contractor to third parties arising out of the performance of this contract: Provided, however, That such claims are not known to the Contractor on thu date of the
execution of the release; and provided further, that the Contractor gives notice of such
claims in writing to the Contracting Officer not more than 6 years after the date of the
release or the date of any notice to the Contractor that the Government is prepared to
make final payment, whichever is earlier . ...
FPR, 41 C.F.R. § 1-7.202-4(f)(2)(ii) (1980) (supply contract); id. § 1-7.402-3(a) (R & D contract). See also ASPR, 32 C.F.R. § 7-203.4(L)(ii)(B) (1980) (supply contract); id. § 7402.3(a) (R & D contract).
1 One procedural problem with both implied and express contractual indemnity is that
the jurisdiction of the district courts over contract suits against the government is limited to
claims under $10,000. Larger contract suits must be brought in the Court of Claims, 28
U.S.C. § 1346 (1976). Thus the plaintiff may sue the contractor in tort in a federal district
court, while the contractor's third party contract action against the government must be
tried separately in the Court of Claims. Murray v. United States, 405 F.2d 1361, 1366 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
7- 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976).
11 Id. § 2210(a)-(p).
76 Id. § 2012(i).
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indemnity problem. The Swine Flu Act 7 was enacted in response
to the unwillingness of drug manufacturers and their insurers to
participate in the national immunization program unless they were
protected from liability. Yielding to pressure 7 8 Congress made the
United States, rather than the drug companies, liable to suit for
injury or death caused by the vaccine. 9
D. Contractor's Defenses Against the Plaintiff
In addition to the government contract defense, the contractor
may invoke general defenses or seek protection under the penumbra of the government's sovereign immunity.
1. General Defenses. The availability and scope of the defenses of contributory negligence, assumption of risk, or plaintiff's
misuse of the product depend on state tort law. Likewise, unless
precluded by a federal statute,80 state law governs the contractor's
ability to set off any collateral benefits, such as workers' compensation payments, against the awarded damages."1
2. Sovereign Immunity for the Government Agent. Government contractors on occasion have argued sucessfully that they are
agents of the sovereign and that the government's immunity therefore should be extended to bar plaintiffs' suits against them. The
agency analysis originated in Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Construction
Co.,812 where the defendant construction company, in the process of
building dikes under the direction and supervision of the Secretary
of War and the Chief of Engineers, washed away part of Yearsley's
land. Rather than pursue a cause of action against the United
States under the taking clause of the fifth amendment,8 3 Yearsley

77 National Swine Flu Immunization Program of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-380,
90 Stat.
1113 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 247b(j)-247b(l) (1976)).
78 "[I]n order to achieve the participation in the program of the agencies, organizations,
and individuals who will manufacture, distribute, and administer the swine flu vaccine
purchased and used in the swine flu program and to assure the availability of such
vaccine in interstate commerce, it is necessary to protect such agencies, organizations,
and individuals against liability ..
42 U.S.C. § 247b(k)(1)(A)(i) (1976).
79 Id.
§ 247b(k)(2)(A) (1976).
go For example, the FECA requires that the United States be subrogated to an employee's claim against a third party, 5 U.S.C. § 8131 (1976).
81 See generally Epstein, Coordinationof Workers' Compensation Benefits With Tort
Damage Awards, 13 FORUM 464 (1978); Weisgall, supra note 23, at 1063-64.
82 309 U.S. 18 (1940).
83 U.S. CONST. amend. V ("nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
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sued the company. Treating the contractor as an agent of the government, the Supreme Court held that the agent could be liable
only "if he exceeded his authority or [if] it was not validly conferred. 's4 Most cases following Yearsley involve a taking of property. 5 They offer no guidance in distinguishing an independent
contractor from an agent; they simply state that, as an agent, the
contractor is entitled to sovereign immunity.
In Brady v. Roosevelt Steamship Co.,86 however, the Supreme
Court declined to apply agency principles across the board to the
contractor situation. The case involved a customs inspector who
died from injuries sustained on a vessel owned by the government
and operated under contract by the steamship company. The company argued that the widow's statutory suit against the government was her sole remedy87 and alternatively, that the terms of the
company's indemnification agreement made the government the
real party in interest.8 8 The Court rejected both contentions. 9 The
agent's liability was not coextensive with the principal's because
"'[a]n instrumentality of government he might be and for the
greatest ends, but the agent, because he is agent, does not cease to
be answerable for his acts.' ,,9o Moreover, "[tihe withdrawal of the
right to sue the agent for his torts would result at times in a substantial dilution of the rights of claimants."9 1 The Court distinguished Yearsley as focusing on the propriety of the delegation of
authority:
But here the situation is quite different. The question is not
whether the [United States Maritime] Commission had authority to delegate to respondent responsibilities for managing
and operating the vessel as its agent. It is whether respondent
can escape liability for a negligent exercise of that delegated

309 U.S. at 21. The opinion characterized the construction company alternatively as
a "contractor" and as an "agent." Id. at 20-21.
" See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 323 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1963); Green v. ICI Am.,
Inc., 362 F. Supp. 1263 (E.D. Tenn. 1973); Dolphin Gardens, Inc. v. United States, 243 F.
Supp. 824 (D. Conn. 1965).
86 317 U.S. 575 (1943).
87Id. at 579-82 (citing Suits in Admiralty Act, 46 U.S.C. § 741, 742 (1940)).
88 317 U.S. at 582.
89Id. at 582-84.
"I Id. at 580 (quoting Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. Emergency Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549,
567 (1922)).
9'317 U.S. at 581.
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power if we assume that by contract it will be exonerated or
92
indemnified for any damages it must pay.
Powell v. United States Cartridge Co.93 limits Yearsley from
another direction, emphasizing that agency status is not automatic
for government contractors. The contractors in the cases consolidated in Powell ran munitions plants on a cost-plus-fixed-fee basis
for the government. The government supplied the materials and
had title to the sites, plants, equipment, raw materials, and
finished products; the contractors were responsible for storing and
loading materials, manufacturing munitions according to government specifications, supervising employees, and operating the
plant. The contractors argued that this arrangement amounted to
an agency relationship, exempting them from the Fair Labor Standards Act.9 4 Relying on the explicit terms of the contract, 95 on the
government's insistence on private rather than public production,
and on the duties of the plant managers, 6 the Court rejected the
argument and found them to be independent contractors. Other
courts have followed Powell's reasoning in rejecting claims by independent contractors that they are agents and therefore entitled to
invoke the sovereign immunity of their government principal as a
97
defense.
If contractors were assimilated to the government, plaintiffs
would lose all causes of action against contractors that could not
be pursued against the government. The negligence case that
might have been maintained against the contractor would be precluded under the discretionary function exception of the FTCA, 98
and all strict products liability claims also would fall because of
the principles outlined in Laird v. Nelms.9 9 The contractor therefore should not enjoy a blanket sovereign immunity defense.
91 Id. at 583-84.
"

339 U.S. 497 (1950).

91 Id. at 504-05.
95 Id. at 505-06. The Court relied especially on language in the contract stating that,

"the Contractoris an independent contractorand in no wise an agent of the Government"
(emphasis by the Court).

"Id. at 506-07.
" Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir. 1974) (supply contract);
Whitaker v. Harvell-Kilgore Corp., 418 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1969) (supply contract); United
States v. Pennsylvania Envt'l Hearing Bd., 431 F. Supp. 747 (M.D. Pa. 1977) (facilities con-

tract), aff'd, 584 F.2d 1273 (3d Cir. 1978).
" See text and notes at notes 12-19 supra.
" See text and notes at notes 20-22 supra.
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III. THE GOVERNMENT CONTRACT DEFENSE IN STRICT LInILITY
CASES

The contours of the government contract defense in negligence
cases already have been explored: the contractor is relieved of liability if the defect is not glaring and obvious.1 00 Many courts have
extended this rationale erroneously to strict liability claims against
government contractors.1 0 1 The parameters of a strict liability suit
are different, however; unlike in a negligence case, the emphasis in
strict liability is on the condition of the product rather than the
behavior of the producer.10 2
Moreover, as shown by the foregoing analysis, the contractor
has a much greater range of protections against the consequences
of the government's defective design specifications than does the
plaintiff. In fact, the plaintiff's only real protection arises from his
ability to sue the contractor, because most claims against the
government are barred by sovereign immunity.10 3
The contractor is not simply the most reachable source of
compensation; he is also the appropriate party on whom to impose
strict liability because of the role he can play in increasing deterrence and thereby minimizing the risk of accidents. 10 Although
the government usually is in the best position to minimize the risk
of defective design specifications,10 5 sovereign immunity reduces its
100

See text and notes at notes 31-34 supra.

101 See, e.g., Hunt v. Blasius, 55 IMI.App. 3d 14, 18, 370 N.E.2d 617, 620 (1977) (finding

the glaring and obvious test "persuasive" even in strict liability), aff'd, 74 Ill. 2d 203, 384
N.E.2d 368 (1978); Moon v. Winger Boss Co., 205 Neb. 292, 287 N.W.2d 430 (1980) (adopt-

ing glaring and obvious test in both negligence and strict liability).
102 See text and notes at notes 38-45 supra.
10' See part 11-A supra.
104 There are a number of other policy justifications for strict liability. Risk spreading-transferring the loss from the injured party to the manufacturer, who is in a better
position to bear the loss by spreading it among his customers-is one such rationale. Enterprise liability-the idea that liability costs should be internalized because the product
should pay its own way-is another. It sometimes is argued that strict products liability is
necessary to relieve the plaintiff of the difficult burden of proving negligence or resorting to
the intricacies of contract law and warranty. In addition, the product by its very presence on
the market carries an implied representation of safety. See generally R. EPsTmN, supra note

5; Birnbaum, supra note 35; Bivins, The Products Liability Crisis: Modest Proposalsfor
Legislative Reform, 11 AKRON L. REv. 595 (1978); Owen, Rethinking the Policies of Strict
Products Liability, 33 VAND. L. REv. 681 (1980); Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel
(StrictLiability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Wade, On the Nature of Strict
Tort Liability for Products,44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
100 In

some cases the contractor may be able to discover and to correct the defect, or

notify the ultimate user, at less cost than the government. See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra
note 7, at 1062-64.
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incentives to calculate the costs of the risks it creates. Through
their freedom to reject government contracts, however, contractors
can bring pressure on the government to encourage accident avoidance. 10 6 A variety of mechanisms are available, such as cost-reimbursement contracts, indemnity clauses in fixed-price contracts,
and agreements to pay insurance premiums. 107 Implied contractual
relief also may be invoked. 10 8 There are notable instances where
statutory changes have been enacted to meet the demands of government contractors. 0 9 These contractual and statutory accommodations transfer the economic burden of defective design specifications from plaintiffs and contractors to the government. By
ultimately bearing the costs of its design defects, the government's
incentives to encourage accident avoidance are enhanced.
Such measures could be counterproductive, however, removing
incentives for the contractor to add his safety efforts to the government's. 10 The problem can be dealt with by a less-than-wholesale
transfer of burdens, leaving the contractor liable for his own negligence and for any defects in construction. Furthermore, when a
contractor is in a better position to detect and remedy the defect
than the government is, it may be desirable to impose a duty to
warn on the contractor."' These mechanisms, while acknowledging
the contractor's right to negotiate around the liability rules, would
give the contractor sufficient incentives to minimize the risk of defective products.
There is one category of cases in which the government contract defense should be recognized. The deterrent value of imposing liability on the government contractor comes from his ability to
reject the contract; if the contractor cannot refuse the contract, he
has no bargaining power and hence no ability to shift the costs of
106 E.g., Coase, The Problems of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & EcoN. 1, 19 (1960) ("when market
transactions are so costly as to make it difficult to change the arrangement of rights established by the law ... the courts directly influence economic activity"). Because the plaintiff
cannot recover directly from the government, the transaction costs involved in the contractual arrangements are unavoidable. See also Landes & Posner, Joint and Multiple
Tortfeasors: An Economic Analysis, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 517 (1980).
107 See text and notes at notes 60-72 supra.
1 See text and notes at notes 57-59 supra.
,og See text and notes at notes 74-79 supra.
11 See Ginsburg, supra note 60, at 344.
m See Calabresi & Hirschoff, supra note 7, at 1062-64. Even if the government was the
party best placed to issue a warning, the contractor still could be liable if the absence of the
warning made the product unreasonably dangerous and if the contractor had control of the
product in its dangerous state. See text and notes at notes 6-8 supra.
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liability to the government. For example, in time of war or national
emergency, normal business relations between the contractor and
the government are disrupted, and the contractor may be confronted with the possibility of a plant seizure if he refuses to accede to government demands.1 1 2 Under these conditions, the contractor should be relieved of liability for defective design and
allowed to rely on the government contract defense.1 13
This exception should be construed narrowly and restricted to
those cases in which the normal assumptions about the contractor's leverage and bargaining power necessarily must be wrong.
The defense based on coercion should require more than a situation in which the contractor cannot alter or revise government
specifications;11 4 it should require that the contractor have no right
to reject the contract. Furthermore, the defense should be available only when the contract is entered into during a time of war or
national emergency declared in accordance with statutory authority115 and should be limited to areas of production that are related
12 The President often is granted statutory authority to regulate the private sector in
time of war or declared national emergency. See Katayama, Emergency Procurement
Powers, 2 Pun. CONT. L.J. 236 (1969). The Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.A. app.
§§ 2061-2169 (1976 & Supp. 1981), is one major source of emergency power in the postWorld War II era. It gives the President the power to set priorities in fulfilling government
contracts and to allocate facilities and materials as he deems necessary for the national
defense. Id. § 2071 (Supp. 1981) (most recent codified extension, Pub. L. No. 96-294, 94
Stat. 633 (1980) to September 30, 1981. The statute has been extended regularly since 1952,
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2166 (Supp. 1981)).
Other statutes give the President powers, effective in war or when war is imminent, to
order production or to take possession of any plant whose owners refuse to produce required
products at a reasonable price. 10 U.S.C. §§ 4501, 9501 (1976). During wartime, the President may require production of ships or w~r material, appropriate all or any part of factory
production for use by the government, and take over any factory for use or operation by the
government. 50 U.S.C. § 82(b) (1976).
In 1976, Congress ended all existing states of emergency in the National Emergencies
Act, Pub. L. No. 94-412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976) (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1651 (1976)).
See also S. REP. No. 94-1168, 94th Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in [1976] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2288. Even after that Act, however, the President retains his power to declare a
state of emergency under appropriate legislation. 50 U.S.C. § 1621(a).
M This exceptional situation should be distinguished from the broader defense that
claims that a contractor is the government's agent and entitled to the government's immunities, criticized in text and notes at notes 82-99 supra.The Eastern District of New York in
In re "Agent Orange" Product Liability Litigation, 506 F. Supp. 762, 792-97 (E.D.N.Y.
1980), failed to recognize this distinction.
H4 This diluted standard was accepted in Merritt, Chapman & Scott Corp. v. Guy F.
Atkinson Co., 295 F.2d 14, 16 (9th Cir. 1961) (California law).
"' See, e.g., Casabianca v. Casabianca, 104 Misc. 2d 348, 428 N.Y.S.2d 400 (Sup. Ct.
1980) (government contractor manufactured kitchen equipment according to Army specifications during World War II; court limited holding to products manufactured during the
war).
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to military necessity, in which a contractor reasonably could fear
intervention if the government's terms were refused. Nor should a
contractor who previously has produced a product under normal
circumstances be able to take advantage of the government contract defense when he produces the same product during a military
emergency.1 1 For example, use of the priority system 117 to set
aside production of an item for use by the military should not
justify the government contract defense if the product has been
marketed previously by the contractor. Any reluctance to produce
on the part of the contractor in that situation might as well be
caused by dissatisfaction with the terms of the government's offer,
such as pricing or scheduling, as by concern with the safety of design specifications.
CONCLUSION
The government contract defense should be recognized only in
rare cases to relieve a contractor of liability for defective government design specifications in strict products liability suits. Although the plaintiff often is barred at the outset from suing the
government, there are several routes a contractor can take in seeking indemnity from the government. Contractual arrangements are
the most effective means, and the contractor is in a better bargaining position with the government than is the injured plaintiff.
Through their power to refuse contracts, contractors can pressure
the government into accepting liability for its design defects. When
the contractor is forced to produce in time of war or declared national emergency, the element of coercion eliminates any deterrent
function that contractor liability might serve. Under those exceptional circumstances the government contract defense should defeat the plaintiff's claim. Under more normal conditions, the contractor, rather than the plaintiff, should bear the burden of the
government's defective design specifications.
Gail Rubin

, In particular, a contractor with expertise in a certain product line actually may be a
cheaper cost avoider than the government, so there is no purpose in shifting the liability
away from him even where he is subject to government coercion.
11 Defense Production Act of 1950, 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2071 (1976 & Supp. 1981). See
note 112 supra.

